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AMATORY JURISPRUDENCE AND THE QUERELLE DES
LOIS
PETER GOODRICH*
INTRODUCTION
In an unremarked passage towards the end of Truth and Method,
Gadamer observes, in the course of a discussion of the Platonic
theory of the good, that "The path of love that is taught by Diotima
leads beyond beautiful bodies to beautiful souls, and from there to
beautiful institutions, customs and laws.. .. " This elliptical and
seemingly incidental reference to a feministic tradition or gender of
law provides the occasion for an interrogation of what such beautiful
customs or just laws might mean in practice. Using the historical
example of laws and judgments of love, of women's courts as also of
the widespread medieval local institution of lovedays (dies amoris), it
will be argued that the dismissal of such gynecocratic and affective
institutions to the extralegal domains of the literary or aesthetic
reflects a querelle des lois or legal form of the querelle des femmes.
Borrowing again from Gadamer a sense of the significance of
tradition in the understanding of law, this article argues that legal
historiography needs to come to terms with the diversity of traditions
and, more specifically, with the repressed tradition of amatory laws.
The denial of alternative juristic traditions or knowledges of law not
only severely limits the value of legal hermeneutics but also further
estranges law from the cultural and corporeal contexts of governance.
I will begin inappropriately with a personal anecdote. There are
two reasons for this: The first is polemical-I wish to 'get medieval'
with the question of legal historiography and to address it in terms of
a long middle ages to which we still belong. The second is
therapeutic-the texts I will address are part of the genre of the
iudicia amoris (judgment of love) which one eminent literary
historian with whom I often agree has described as "flounder[ing] on
* Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University, New York.
1. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 435 (Garrett Barden & John
Cumming eds., Sheed & Ward Ltd. trans., 1975) (1960).
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a tedious no-man's land between pseudo-document and literary
text."'2 Amatory jurisprudence, in this now conventional dismissal, is
quintessentially marked by failure; it is the "least successful of courtly
forms."3 If I am bound towards a reading of deficient texts and torpid
laws that have neither referent nor being, then it would be impolite
not to cushion this threat with the contrary narrative of their spectral
force and present engagements.
Funded some years ago by the British Academy, I was engaged
upon a study of the doctrine of the fin' amors and the literature of
courtly or, depending upon one's position, discourtly love. It was
February 14, Valentine's Day, 1994. In those days one could only
obtain a seat in the Bibliothque Nationale if one arrived and queued
for some half an hour before the doors opened at 9 A.M. I worked all
day, and, as is always the case when I work in libraries, particularly in
the discomfort and surveillance of manuscript rooms, I became prone
to the soft hallucinations engendered by lack of sleep and the gentle
yet real narcotic given off by texts. It was in such an atmosphere that
I called up a manuscript detailing the establishment by royal decree,
on February 14, 1400, of a cour amoureuse, or "High Court of Love"
in Paris.4 For a disenchanted lawyer, this was an intoxicating notion,
and with the fragile lead of a propelling pencil I scribbled down the
intricate details of constitution, procedure, and judgment in this court
of appeal in the jurisdiction of amatory law.
I worked until the library closed around 7 P.M. and then took the
metro to the Left Bank where I was staying near the Pantheon.
Leaving the subway station as the sun was setting, I slowly became
aware that the streets were strewn with broken eggs. Still embalmed
in the euphoria of medieval texts, I excitedly imagined that these raw
and shattered carapaces were the signs of an obscure or esoteric
Valentine's Day rite. In this reverie, I reasoned that the eggs must
mark some Amazonian ovulary ritual in which the power of
procreation and the French tradition of femmes fortes was reenacted
momentarily and festively in the public sphere by the smashing of
eggs.
The possibilities were endless. Admittedly one of them, as I later
2. R. HOWARD BLOCH, MEDIEVAL FRENCH LITERATURE AND LAW 214 (1977).
3. Id.
4. See LA COUR AMOUREUSE DITE DE CHARLES VI (Carla Bozzolo & H6lne Loyau
eds., 1982) (explicating the procedures of the High Court of Love and the statute of 1400 that
established them). For a brief description, see PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF
LOVE: LITERATURE AND OTHER MINOR JURISPRUDENCES 1-3 (1996).
[Vol. 76:751
2000] AMA TORYJURISPRUDENCE AND THE QUERELLE DES LOIS 753
discovered, was that the eggs had been left from a student
demonstration against cuts in education. On reflection, however,
even that explanation fits well with the thesis I wish to elaborate. It
suggests a certain autonomy from the past and a complex semiosis to
the images that mark the theater and polemic of the contemporary
public sphere. In this instance, the conjunctions of intimacy and
publicity, of apparent and real, of medieval and modern, and of love
and law were positively uncanny. In short, the fragments of shell and
broken yokes marked for me a reversal of the juristic order of
historical causes and of the quotidian norms of municipal rule. Let
me be explicit: It was Valentine's Day and at twilight the streets of
Paris were strewn with broken eggs. It does not take any great feat of
lateral thinking to read this sign in structural terms: the visible order
of the city had been disrupted by the sudden staging of a more
intimate public sphere, the order of genders had been disturbed, and
the public domain of appearances had clearly been marked by the
intrusion of a lust or law, cupidity or caritas according to one's
hermeneutic preference, too powerful and subversive to be directly
addressed or staged. The latter significance, marked by the
destruction or shattering of eggs, is indicative also of the trauma of
origins, and consequently their recollection through the repetitive
invocation of rites, through indirect or displaced forms.
The notion of a Valentine's Day rite in which Parisian lovers
stage an enigmatic and invisible law, in which an alternative and
intimate public sphere is enacted in visible forms on the city streets, is
one which does not in fact divagate far from the historiographical
norm that treats the laws of love-the laws of the first Venus-as the
other, the "backface," or underside of a positive and implicitly virile
governance. Undeterred, I wish to devote this paper to sketching the
face of that evanescent history of an intimate and amorous public
sphere. In a more formal idiom, I will make two arguments. The first
is simply that it is possible to reconstruct from literary and legal
sources a coherent body of doctrine and law that together comprises
what I will term "amatory jurisprudence," the historical and
continuing jurisdiction of the laws of love. The second and stronger
argument relates to the question of the epistemological and
ontological status of these laws. It should be obvious already that I
believe that what was at various times explicitly designated as a "gay
science" of law should be treated-read, acted upon-if not seriously,
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then at least with humor and imagination.5 It is my view, and no
doubt I am now preempting my conclusion, that what literary and
feminist historicism recognizes as the querelle des femmes (the debate
as to the status and political role of women) was in fact underpinned
and motivated by a much less explicit, yet nonetheless portentous,
querelle des lois. The querelle des femmes, in other words, was always
a polemic as to the legal status of women, as to their definition and
role in theology and jurisprudence, canon and civil law. It has also
been argued persuasively that much of the querelle des femmes was
presented-pleaded-by means of legal rhetoric. More than that,
however, what the recovery of amatory jurisprudence can help to
show is that the querelle des femmes was predicated upon a conflict of
jurisdictions and, at base, addressed the primary political question of
which law was to govern: masculine or feminine, that of amity or
fraternity, of Venus or polity, of love or regality.
I. LAWDAYS AND LOVEDAYS
Legal historiography is not entirely ignorant of the jurisdiction of
love. Christian theology passed on the maxim associated most often
with Boethius that love is the greater law (maior lex amor est), and
the glossatorial tradition included works such as Forcadel's Cupido
Iurisperitus,6 Boncompagnus's Rota Veneris,7 Benoit de Court's
Commentaires Juridiques et Joyeux,8 and also Selden's Jani Anglorum
Facies Altera, which looked explicitly to the "other" or feminine
"face" of secular law.9 As Selden's seldom mentioned work makes
clear even in its title, the tradition of amatory jurisprudence was
eccentric to legal doctrine and of only antiquarian interest to the
emergent national law. Within the common-law tradition, the early
modern growth of law entailed the absorption of all other
5. See Peter Goodrich, Gay Science and Law, in RHETORIC AND LAW IN EARLY
MODERN EUROPE (Vicky Kahn & Lorna Hutson eds., forthcoming 2001).
6. STEPHANO FORCATULO BLITERENSI, CUPIDO IURISPERITUS [THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF LOVE] (1553).
7. BONCOMPAGNO DA SIGNA, ROTA VENERIS [THE WHEEL OF LOVE] (Josef Purkart
trans., Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints 1975) (1185).
8. Benoit de Court, Commentaires Juridiques et Joyeux [Juridical and Joyful
Commentaries (on the Judgments of Love)], reprinted in MARTIAL D'AUVERGNE, LES ARRtTS
D'AMOURS, AVEC L'AMANT RENDU CORDELIER, A L'OBSERVANCE D'AMOURS (1731).
9. See JOHN SELDEN, JANI ANGLORUM FACES ALTERA [THE OTHER FACE OF THE
ENGLISH JANUS] (London, T. Bassett 1683) (1610). For discussion of this tradition, see LAW
AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A LEGENDRE READER 72-94 (Peter Goodrich ed., Peter Goodrich et
al. trans., 1997). On the querelle des femmes in common law, see PETER GOODRICH, OEDIPUS
LEX: PSYCHOANALYSIS, HISTORY, LAW 108-80 (1995).
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jurisdictions, whether spiritual, local, regional, or based upon some
profession, trade, or other expertise. The question of the status of
women was treated as resolved by a combination of divine and Salic
law. In England, Chief Justice Fortescue's exhaustive mid-fifteenth-
century treatise on the topic of women's rule, De Natura Legis
Naturae,0 had seemingly already judged the issue comprehensively in
favor of the exclusion of women from the public sphere.,,
If lawyers treated the querelle des femmes as being at best a
polemic within the domain of political philosophy and as generative
at most of considerations of policy and not of principle or law, it is
perhaps unsurprising that legal historians did not expend their time,
or at least not until very recently, upon what was in juristic
epistemology the pseudo-reality of courts and laws of love. While
philosophers might from time to time discuss the perennial quaestio
quid iuris (question of which law), the notion of a higher law-of a
first law or law of law-was not of any practical significance either to
lawyers or to legal doctrine. What could be said, but there was really
no need to say it, not even in the relatively esoteric realm of legal
history, was that laws of love were antique examples of what the
science of jurisprudence had historically to sever from its purview so
as to become a science. Put simply, the aspiration of modern legal
scholarship has been that of writing, or at least of influencing the
writing of, law. To influence the writing of law meant to stick closely
to the establishment or institution of law and, most particularly, to
accept the pragmatic definition of legality implicit within the official
profession and practice of law.
If law is conceived as a unitary system of municipal norms and is
expounded dogmatically in terms of sources and definite authorities
extant within a momentary system of rules, there is neither room nor
reason to look at the question of other jurisdictions or alternative and
disparate sources of rule. Legal historiography has suffered from that
unitary drive or systemic belief in what are in essence nationalistic
systems of governance and their territorial competencies. My point,
however, is not to play overlong on the trope of an absence, this
aposiopesis which marks the historical and juristic place of the
10. See SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE NATURA LEGIS NATURAE [ON THE NATURE OF
NATURAL LAW] (Chichester Fortescue trans., Garland Publishing 1980) (1462).
11. By the time that Sir Thomas Smith's De Republica Anglorum was published in 1584, it
was possible simply to assume the inferiority of women and the rectitude of their consignment
to the gynaeceum. See SIR THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 58-59 (Mary Dewar
ed., 1982) (1584),
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feminine. Rather, I want to indicate the epistemic site from which the
judgments and laws of love appear as belonging to a tedious no-man's
land, to the domain of failure, ludic pretence, or even the intellectual
deceit that is sometimes deemed to accompany the aspersion of
reality or attribution of value to an ontological nothing, nihil, or
nonbeing.
Lest these remarks seem somewhat caustic, glib, or loaded, it is
worth observing that the apparent trajectory of amatory
jurisprudence, and now I will begin to group together certain of the
texts to which this peculiar jurisdiction refers, has been from law to
farce. It is necessary, of course, to suspend our philosophical
prejudices as to what is meant by law for it even to be worth initially
tracing the trajectory of the querelle des lois. That said, the long term
of amatory jurisprudence has been that of an ineluctable movement
from heresy to conformity, from polemic to parody, from gaiety to
ridicule. In nominate form, the trajectory takes us from Andreas
Capellanus to Francois Calli~res, from Christine de Pisan to the
Pr~cieuses Ridicules, from Mahieu le Poirier to Jean Donneau de
Vis6, and from the trobairitz to Martial d'Auvergne and thence to
Guillaume Coquillart and the theater of the Basoche.12 The trajectory
reflects a consistent change in the genre of the laws of love. The
passage from law to farce is also a transfer from one status and
discipline to another, namely, from politics to theater, from legal
practice to literary fiction, and from jurisprudence to aesthetics.
My suggestion is that this trajectory and these changes of
epistemic and rhetorical scene reflect hermeneutic changes; shifts in
the way we read the tradition and texts that comprise this minor
jurisdiction, its judgments and its laws. It is necessary, first, to
liberalize somewhat the definition of legality and the modality in
which we think of law. Borrowing from contemporary social theory,
12. Respectively, and with no attempt at being comprehensive, see ANDREAS
CAPELLANUS, ANDREAS CAPELLANUS ON LOVE (P.G. Walsh ed. & trans., Duckworth 1982)
(1176); FRANCOIS CALLIRES, NOUVELLES AMOUREUSES ET GALANTES (Paris, Gabriel 1679);
CHRISTINE DE PISAN, Le Livre de Trois Jugemens, in THE LOVE DEBATE POEMS OF CHRISTINE
DE PIZAN 155 (Barbara K. Altman ed., 1998) (1400) [hereinafter DE PISAN, Trois Jugemens];
MOLItPRE, LES PRtCIEUSES RIDICULES (Denis Canal ed., Larousse 1990) (1659); MAHIEU LE
POIRIER, LE COURT D'AMOURS DE MAHIEU LE POIRIER ET LA SUITE ANONYME DE LA
"COURT D'AMOURS" (Terence Scully ed., 1976) (1731); JEAN DONNEAU DE VISt, LES
NOUVELLES GALANTES, COMIQUES, ET TRAGIQUES (Slatkine Reprints 1979) (1680). On the
trobairitz, see CHANTS D'AMOUR DES FEMMES-TROUBADOURS: TROBAIRITZ ET "CHANSONS
DE FEMME" (Pierre Bec ed., 1995); MARTIAL D'AUVERGNE, supra note 8. On the Basoche, see
Stephanie Lysyk, Love of the Censor: Legendre, Censorship, and the Theatre of the Basoche, 11
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 113 (1999).
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law refers not to a unity of behavior or empirical practices but to a
series of systems of communication and, in an epistemic idiom, a
variety of modes of thought. 13 In these terms, it can also be noted that
a legal jurisdiction refers neither to a territorial competence nor to a
power or practice of enforcement but rather to a right to speak, a site
of enunciation, and therefore ultimately to an oratorical or scriptural
destiny. Remaining at this modest and perhaps mundane level of
definition, it cannot escape notice that law, or more properly laws, are
intrinsically bound to questions of language and utterance, narrative
and performance, force and persuasion. No amount of rationalization
nor myriad quantities of dulling custom or common sense can excise
law from the monkey on its coattails; its artistic mirror, its twin, its
rhetoric.
Changes in the relationship between rhetoric and law have
marked all the major moments of recovery, reform, or growth of legal
systems: the reception, humanism, vernacularization, codification,
realism, and criticism, to name but a few disparate events, were all
driven by changes in the scholarly conception of the rhetorical and
interpretative disciplines that should be applied to law. It is perhaps
not too radical a suggestion (in a contemporary context that is
marked scholastically and politically by diversity and pluralization of
identities) to propose a reconsideration of legal identity both in terms
of the differing forms and disciplines through which law is
communicated and in terms of the diverse jurisdictions or sites
through which governance is effected. A shift, in other words,
towards a more rhetorically rigorous concept of legal studies suggests
both a diversification and a mediation of law through other
disciplines. Such mediation opens up the possibility of once again
addressing the history of the jurisdictions that the nationalist systems
of law absorbed, annexed, concealed, or destroyed in the epistemic
and political process of the modern expansion and unification of legal
jurisdictions.
It is important to acknowledge in passing that legal or quasi-legal
scholarship has not entirely ignored the possibilities exposed by
reclassification of juristic orders of governance. There have recently
and not so recently been studies that have endeavored to localize and
rethink the historical order of legal disciplines. There is Hunt's
13. See, e.g., TIM MURPHY, THE OLDEST SOCIAL SCIENCE?: CONFIGURATIONS OF LAW
AND MODERNITY (1997); see also Peter Goodrich, Anti-Teubner: Autopoiesis, Paradox, and the
Theory of Law, 13 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 197 (1999).
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materialist history of sumptuary law,14 Hartog's vignette of the law of
pigs in nineteenth-century New York,15 Ariela Gross's account of the
litigation of whiteness, 16 and John Baker's wonderful discourse on
whether lawyers were able to hear the judges in the Inns of Court and
so accurately record their dicta.17 At the level of theory, Donald
Kelley has mapped the role of law in social thought,18 and Tim
Murphy has expansively accounted the growing chasm that separates
the classical model of law as judgment from the communicative
networks and actuarially based logics that inform contemporary
regimes of knowledge and, consequently, the administrative exercise
of power. 9 There is, of course, extensive work in social anthropology
and in law and society that attests to expanding concern with
autonomous and local regimes of truth and with the norms of
community or of relationship that such regimes or modes of
governance employ. My point is simply that amatory jurisprudence
conceived as a jurisdiction and, more radically, as a mode of thought
can be approached best through that history of juristic diaspora or
plural legal regimes.
It is only recently that the laws of the intimate public sphere have
begun to escape the taboo of privacy and the confinement of the
private sphere. Let me be clear: I do not wish to suggest that amatory
jurisprudence is somehow to be understood as the law of the private
domain or even that las leys d'amor-the laws of love-are somehow
competitors with or a law prior to that of the municipal orders of the
secular polity. My arguments are more modest. Amatory
jurisprudence constituted one historical jurisdiction of rule, and, more
specifically, it provided a site for the enunciation of a language, a set
of norms and space of dialogue within which the parameters of
intimacy and the duties of amorous relationships, the intensities and
durations of desire, could be elaborated, debated, and judged. My
first question, then, with respect to this jurisdiction must be that of its
relation to the legal proprium: is it anything more than historiography
14. See ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSIONS: A HISTORY OF
SUMPTUARY LAW (1996).
15. See Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 899.
16. See Ariela Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-
Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998).
17. See J.H. Baker, Introduction to 1 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN, at ix, xvii (J.H.
Baker ed., 1977).
1& See DONALD KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION (1990).
19. See MURPHY, supra note 13.
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assumes, namely, the momentary subversion or decomposition of
legal rule?
The querelle des femmes was in form a polemic. The accom-
panying querelle des lois, therefore, has to be read initially in light of
that antithetical or combative discursive form. The laws of love
existed historically in the occluded domain of the motives for the
polemic. A first reading of references to the laws of love is thus
already caught up in the negative or defensive depiction of an
inverted space outside of royal or municipal law. This space of
mirroring was referred to by some in terms of the laws of the first
Venus and also in a more christian idiom as lex caritatis, or lex
amatoriae. Such law already belonged, however, to the spiritual
rather than the temporal, to the soul rather than the body, to the
gynaeceum rather than the polity, to literature rather than the real.
As a result, such references have a negative if powerful resonance and
are depicted as a species of beyond of law; as the exception rather
than the rule. They are seen thus as belonging to a temporality
outside of Spelman's law terms and, more explicitly still, as part of the
inverted world of the dies nefastes (days when the praetor could not
speak) or, latterly, the days of festival (dies feriales) when the law did
not obtain.20
There were of course many forms of law appropriate to leisure or
to what was conceived by the time of the Renaissance as the vacation
or "intermission" associated with non-law days. The court of
pipowders, for example, followed the fairs and would adjudicate
disputes that occurred in that context. Meanwhile, the rule of the
Church- dies pacis Ecclesiae-more generally governed those times
when royal law was suspended. The conflict of jurisdictions was
already, in other words, filtered through an opposition between law
days (dies juridicos) and the difference or exception that marked their
abeyance or suspension. The most common historical reference to
laws of love indeed occurs in this context: dies amoris or in the Anglo-
Saxon, a loveday, was a day when parties would reconcile outside of
court. Such compromise or compact was waged in love (per amorem)
and most usually without formal judgment. It was witnessed by
friendship (per amicitia), by friends and kin, and was sealed or
marked by a kiss, the osculum pacis of faith or of christian love.21
20. See SIR HENRY SPELMAN, OF THE LAW TERMS: A DISCOURSE 3-4 (London,
Gillyflower 1684) (1614), microformed on Wing: Early English Books 1641-1700, Reel 825
(Univ. Microforms Int'l 1978).
21. For a general and excellent overview of the institution, see Josephine Waters Bennett,
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That lovedays were a common feature of local law from Saxon
times onwards cannot be disputed. The thane, according to the laws
of Aethelred, had a choice between lufu (love) and lagu (law) and
was bound to the jurisdiction he chose.2" If chosen, in other words,
the law of love would override or conquer secular legal procedures.
The choice in favor of love would lead to a resolution that did not
need formal judgment or record and so it left few traces. It has even
been suggested, and the suggestion is a good one, that when Bracton
says at the beginning of De Legibus that "law comes from nothing
written, ' 23 his remark not only opposes custom or ius non scriptum to
the tradition of codification but also refers to a spirit of concord, of
amity and peace, that did not depend upon the harsh arbitrium of
formal legal rule.2 4 That love leaves few traces, that it is hard to
follow the spirit of amity or the rule of affection, does not mean that
there are no signs to follow. Those that have been recovered indeed
indicate not only that love prevailed over law but also that recourse to
love and to the resources of friendship was extremely common.
Glanvill notes that agreement -amity -generally supersedes law,21
and the much cited text of the Anglo-Norman Leges Henrici Primi
explicitly legislates that "agreement prevails over law and love over
judgment. '2 6 The Leges also instructs that love brings disputants
together while judgment separates them. Friendship, continuing
relationship, requires agreement, and hence the pervasiveness of
lovedays or days of accord within the rolls and, more generally, within
the margins of royal law.
The Leges make it clear that the law of love was not simply
respected and binding but also in most respects superior to the
antagonism and absolutism of formal judgments. By chapter 54 of the
Leges, it is explicitly stated that where agreement was reached
through love (ex amore), it could not be appealed to any other court
The Medieval Loveday, 23 SPECULUM 351 (1958).
22. See THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM EDMUND TO HENRY I 70 (A.J.
Robertson ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1925).
23. See 2 BRACTON, BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE [BRACTON
ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND] 19 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968).
24. See Michael T. Clanchy, Law and Love in the Middle Ages, in DISPUTES AND
SETTLEMENTS: LAW AND HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE WEST 51 (John Bossy ed., 1983).
25. See THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND
COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 129 (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans., 1965).
26. See LEGES HENRICI PRIMI 164 (L.J. Downer ed. & trans., 1972) ("Pactum enim legem
uincit et amor iudicium.").
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or jurisdiction. 27 The bonds of affection and the spaces of friendship,
of communication and continuing relationship, seem to have been
more profound, more pervasive, and more enduring than the
vinculum iuris (chain of formal law). Moving outside the common
law, a comparable claim can be made for much of France, where
concordiae or conventiae (extra-judicial wagers of dispute mediated
through friends, determined by agreement, and marked by a kiss, a
meal, or some other symbol, rite, or exchange) often constituted the
most common form of resolution.28
It would be tempting to suggest that the affections and their
governance of intimate spaces were the rule, rather than the
exception; that the unwritten law was a law of the lightness of being-
an amorous government to which formal law was itself the passionless
exception. Such a reversal of our understanding of the order of
jurisdictions, however, simply reenacts in inverted form the obsessive
juristic desire to classify and tabulate a hierarchical order of
precedence. My concern is different and more eccentric. The
concern of the action per amorem to address the dictates of affection,
the space of relationship and the continuance of friendships, should
not merely be a pretext for denouncing formal legal rule or for
berating a juristic historiography that has treated the rule as the
exception. It is better by far to reopen the question of the
significance of the loveday and to expand an inquiry into its
jurisprudence and weightless inscriptions.
The initial point to make is that the dies amoris, action per
amorem, and various species of settlement of claim (e.g., concordiae,
conventiae) were not exceptions to an overriding legal norm or
inversions of a normalizing practice but rather were a different
jurisdiction; an alternative law within the same space and temporality
as that of royal rule. In its most radical formulation, we could say that
love played the law and reclaimed its antique jurisdiction. Certainly,
if we take the example of the records from the abbey of Marmoutier
studied by Stephen White, the action per amorem would settle
disputes as to title and boundaries of property, inheritance, dues
owed the monks, the rights of Churches, maritagium owing or passed
27. See id. at 173.
28. See Fredric L. Cheyette, Suum Cuique Tribuere, 6 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 287 (1970);
Stephen White, "Pactum... Legem Vincit et Amor Judicium": The Settlement of Disuputes in
Eleventh-Century Western France, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 281 (1978). More broadly, see
Bennett, supra note 21.
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on, and the validity of sales or transfers of land.29 Such grievances
were equally the domain of law. In addition, because disputes were
eventually settled through love does not mean that they were never
violent; indeed, they often were. Thus, both in substance and in form,
these disputes occupied the same terrain as the king's peace that was
the substrate of secular legality. Borrowing a language and practice
from older traditions of rhetorical ethos, of friendship, affect, poetic,
and imagination, the loveday offered not simply a different aesthetic
or style of communication but also a different theory or sense of
justice and law. It is to that question of the aesthetic and justice of
relationship, of the transitivity of love and of friendship, that amatory
jurisprudence belongs.
The rhetoric of amicable agreement and of amorous actions is
that of amity overriding enmity, of compromises and concords
worked out through the mediation of friends and in the spirit of the
justice of love. It is also a species of oratorical ritual in which law
marks resolution through the exchange of gifts, eating common food,
and sharing tears and kisses. These symbols and figures of a first or
greater law, of copulation triumphing over the separation of formal
law, belongs genealogically at least in part to the language of religion
and a rhetoric, lyric, and poetry of love's laws. The most usual topos,
one which bears repetition in that it exactly coincides with the Anglo-
Norman code of the Leges Henrici Primi, can be extracted from
Llull's Rhetorica Nova and the maxim that love (caritatis) will obtain
what law fails to acquire.30 A woman lost her husband while he was
fighting to defend the king. She subsequently lost her home to
invading enemies of the crown. Destitute and unable to support
herself or her children she goes to the king accompanied by a friend
and by a nephew who is a lawyer (iurista). The lawyer argues her
case in a legalistic manner, proposing that the king was under an
obligation to provide for the woman because her poverty was a result
of her husband's service to the king. The king declined to support the
woman, whereupon her friend tearfully pleaded her case in love.
Though he had been unmoved by the lawyer's words, the king could
not resist the persuasive power or inclination of love and so provided
for the woman and her family. Love, affectual as opposed to formal
legal bonds, passion, and care as the modes of communication, in this
29. See White, supra note 28.
30. See RAMON LLULL, RAMON LLULL'S NEW RHETORIC: TEXT AND TRANSLATION OF
LLULL'S RHETORICA NOVA 50 (Mark D. Johnston ed. & trans., Hermagoras Press 1994) (1295).
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common oratorical argument, will triumph over law. If we are to
avoid negatively opposing love to law, we are forced again to ask
what space, what jurisdiction is occupied by love, and equally, what
epistemic status should be attributed to its judgments, its rhetoric, and
its laws?
II. THE QUERELLE DES Lois
As the example from the Rhetorica Nova suggests, the first
jurisdiction of love is rhetorical. Whether elaborated in terms of
christian doctrine - as amor purus or caritas - or in those of literature
and lyric-as joy and gay science-the domain of the laws of love is
that of communication. My argument, in other words, is that the
jurisprudence and casuistry of love constitutes a communicative
network, a language and semiotic, which opens up, elaborates, and
where necessary judges-resolves, that is, but does not determine-
conflicts, disputes, and on occasion acts of violence in a manner
appropriate to the affectivity or emotive bonds of the intimate public
sphere. In that the surviving tradition of this amatory jurisprudence is
consistently, or at least at its most interesting, either heretical or
pagan in its advocacy of mixed love, of both spiritual and physical
affection, I will address directly those laws and questions of love that
deal most directly with the physical signs as well as the rules of
communicating and consummating the desire for intimacy.
The polemical claim of the querelle des femmes, in its masculine
version, has always been that the laws of love lack reason and lack
seriousness. At its strongest, the argument is that these laws are
unreal-they lack records or other proof of institutional
enforcement-and heretical, which means, in a more modern idiom,
that they are antisocial and unethical. It is that polemic, one which
consigns the space of love's laws to the enigmatic and occult domain
of the body, its fluids, excitations, and other unmarked incorporations
of desire, that has led to the historiographical trajectory mentioned
earlier from law to farce. The substance of the laws of love could
only be addressed in the form of the denial of their legality: the
querelle, in other words, could only take these laws seriously, could
only address them at all, in terms of heresy, unreason, then theater,
and finally farce. The gay science of law, the erudition in "ces propos
torche-culatifs" that Rabelais mentions as the grounds for a doctorate
in gay science, even Nietzsche's recuperative concept of the
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seriousness of parody, reflect a relation to "the sex of knowledge,' 31
the intimacies of its incorporation, as much as they dispose of a
substantive interpretation of an extensive corpus of literary texts and
practices.
The laws of love always challenged-gently, hilariously,
poetically, dramatically-the scriptural rubric of seriousness that
accompanied and accompanies still the writing and the recuperation
or historiography of secular laws. What, then, is written out of the
ambit of the histories and jurisdictions of law? This question moves
beyond theory to the substance and practice of law. In its most
immediate and pressing form, law in its classical definition concerns
persons, actions, and things. As formulated by Cicero, though in
essence this was always the scholastic position, a person is someone
who speaks, an orator, a site or 'mask' of communication; an action is
a performance or staging of the real, an enactment of truth being best
translated in terms of the theater of justice and law; while things are
the res of the public sphere, the affects and bonds through and across
which social interaction occurs.32 The question of law, therefore,
immediately engaged with what Foucault would later discuss in terms
of life-style or aesthetic of living and what we medievals then and now
should recognise as the intimate public sphere, a paradoxical or
liminal domain of transgressive rules, of serious pleasures and jocular
or modest knowledges.
Let us look at the corpus of this law and recollect at the same
time that this very notion of a body of laws suggests an attention to
the physical texture, the embodiment and sexuality of such stagings of
the real that were known then and opaquely still as laws. The
Tractatus de Amore contains twelve precepts or principles of love,"
twenty-one judgments of amorous disputes and questions of love
from women's courts,34 as well as a Code of Love comprised of thirty-
one clauses.33  The treatise itself also contains many further
discussions and resolutions of questions or casuistic problems of love
that range from disputations on the sorrows and pleasures of love to
the grounds for choosing or rejecting a lover, ending a relationship, or
31. MICHILE LE DOEUF, LE SEXE DU SAVOIR 274-75 (1998).
32. For a technical account, see C.O. BRINK, Quintilian's de Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae
and Tacitus' Dialogus Oratoribus, 39 CLASSICAL Q. 472 (1989). More broadly on theater and
the rhetoric of law, see Peter Goodrich, Law, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC (Tom
Sloan ed., forthcoming 2001).
33. See CAPELLANUS, supra note 12, at 117.
34. See id. at 251-71.
35. See id. at 283.
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consummating a passion. The Carmina Burana contain numerous
references to courts and judgments of love as well as several
substantive judgments on issues such as whether pure love was
preferable to the physical pleasures of sex or whether knights or
clerics made better lovers.36 The poetry of the troubadours and of the
trobairitz equally contain numerous tensons, judgments on questions
of love and disputes between lovers. In the later and revived
moments of the courtly tradition, further questions and judgments
can be found in Boccaccio's Filocolo,37 in Christine de Pisan's Book of
Three Judgments,3 8 in Alain Chartier, 39 in Mahieu le Poirier's Cour
d'Amour and Suite Anonyme,4° in Guillaume de Machaut's Judgments
of the Kings of Behaigne and Navare,41 and then also in Las Leys
d'Amor and Las Flors del Gay Saber that established the Gay
Consistory and the mid-fourteenth-century tradition of poetic
tournaments and their judgment by a judicial college or Consistory
governed by the rhetorical rules that bore the name of laws of love.
42
In the later tradition, further judgments are found in Martial
d'Auvergne's Arrets d'Amour, in de Vis6, Calli~res, and more
interestingly, in the writings of the pr~cieuses and particularly those of
Madeleine de Scud6ry, Marie Catherine Desjardins (Madame
Villedieu), and Madame de Montpensier. 41
For those who do not know or who are momentarily forgetful of
the judgments of love, they are best or at least most briefly depicted
as addressing the affective space, the intensity and duration of
amorous affairs. A variety of judgments thus addressed the signs of
passion, the occasions of physical contact and pleasure, the
36. See CARMINA BURANA (A. Hilka et al. eds., 1930).
37. GIOVANNI BOCCACCIO, THIRTEEN MOST PLEASANT AND DELECTABLE QUESTIONS
OF LOVE, ENTITLED: A DISPORT OF DIVERSE NOBLE PERSONAGES (Harry Carter ed., C.N.
Potter 1974) (1566).
38. See DE PISAN, Trois Jugemens, supra note 12; see also CHRISTINE DE PISAN, LE DEBAT
SUR LE ROMAN DE LA ROSE (Eric Hicks ed., 1977).
39. See Alain Chartier, La Belle Dame sans Merci, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF ALAIN
CHARTIER 328 (J.C. Laidlaw ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1974) (1617).
40. See LE POIRIER, supra note 12.
41. See GUILLAUME DE MACHAUT, LE JUGEMENT DU ROY DE BEHAIGNE (n.d.),
reprinted in LE JUGEMENT DU ROY DE BEHAIGNE AND REMEDE DE FORTUNE (James I.
Wimsatt & William W. Kibler eds., 1988).
42. See LAS FLORS DEL GAY SABER ESTIER DICHAS LAS LEYS D'AMORS (M. Gatien-
Arnoult ed., Slatkine Reprints 1977).
43. On the prcieuses, see the general account in JEAN-MICHEL PELOUS, AMOUR
PRtCIEUX, AMOUR GALANT (1654-1675) (1980); for a more recent discussion, see also
MYRIAM MAITRE, LES PRtCIEUSES: NAISSANCE DES FEMMES DE LETrRES EN FRANCE AU
XVIIE SIPECLE (1999). For an account of the prcieuses and their laws, see Peter Goodrich,
Epistolary Justice: The Love Letter As Law, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 245 (1997).
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parameters of fidelity, and the place, quantification, and other roles
of humor, sorrow, and violence in amorous encounters. Gauged most
openly to the carnal and illicit realm of passionate love and its ludic
or gay knowledges, the judgments also increasingly focussed upon the
hermeneutics of the love affair: the Code of Love listed the items that
could properly be gifts to a loved one, the occasions and ruses of
correspondence between lovers, and the times and forms in which
they could meet. In this context, the role of the confidante, of
servants, friends, and other media of communication, was also much
disputed and judged.
If we move from the explicit judgments, precepts, and rules to
the doctrinal traditions of the laws of love, a remarkable conspectus
of texts dealing not only with casuistic quaestiones amoris but equally
with the rules of love can be traced from the reception of Ovid's Ars
Amatoriae, to Christine de Pisan, H61isenne de Crenne,44 the
anonymous Chaucerian Court of Love,45 the Confessio Amantis,46 The
Flower of Friendship,47 and all those later women and men who
staged, disputed, or described the courts of love. This doctrine-
traditio or communis opinio iuris amantis-provides, in other words,
the interpretative framework through which amatory jurisprudence
read and applied the laws and other rulings, principles and
precedents, and maxims and dicta of lovers' laws.
The defensiveness that must at some level be associated with
introducing lists of names and texts should not distract attention from
the underlying issue which is that of the uneasy and at times
competitive or antagonistic coexistence of differing jurisdictions. The
querelle des lois is in this context both an assertion and, latterly, the
revenge of an amorous jurisdiction and its laws of love upon the
increasing closure of the formal rule of law. The embrace of the
emotional geographies of the polity, the cartographies of the
embodiment of desire, the rules that resolved the degrees of pleasure
44. HELISENNE DE CRENNE, LES tPISTRES FAMILItRES ET INVECTIVES DE MADAME
HILISENNE (Jerry C. Nash ed., 1996) (1538). For an English translation of one of De Crenne's
works, see HELISENNE DE CRENNE, THE TORMENTS OF LOVE (Lisa Neal ed., Lisa Neal &
Steven Randall trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1996).
45. Anonymous, The Court of Love, reprinted in 7 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF GEOFFREY
CHAUCER 409 (Walter W. Skeat ed., 1897).
46. JOHN GOWER, Confessio Amantis (1390), reprinted in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
JOHN GOWER: THE ENGLISH WORKS 1 (G.C. Macaulay ed., 1901).
47. EDMUND TILNEY, A BRIEFE AND PLEASANT DISCOURSE OF DUTIES IN MARIAGE,
CALLED THE FLOWER OF FRIENDSHIPPE (1573). For a modem version, see EDMUND TILNEY,
THE FLOWER OF FRIENDSHIP: A RENAISSANCE DIALOGUE CONTESTING MARRIAGE (Valerie
Wayne ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1992).
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or of suffering, the pains of death and the ecstasies of kiss, caress, and
coitus, juxtaposed another law beside that of municipal and
commercial jurisdictions. The laws of love were an assertion of an
emotional polity, an intimate geography, and a corporeal and desiring
reality. Where Bloch suggests that courts of love "act as a further
sign of a homological rapport" between amorous and judicial
institutions,48 I would like to propose something more pleasant and
less untrustworthy than a homology. The querelle des lois, the
elaboration of a jurisdiction and corpus of laws of love, expresses a
necessary and indeed urgent dimension of all law. In the end, a
significant dimension of legality necessarily rests upon and intervenes
in the world of embodiment and relationship. Yet it is only amatory
jurisprudence that has or can address the affective bonds that are
expressed in or projected by the actors in the drama of formal law.
The emotional cartography and casuistically expounded ethics of
the laws of love are intrinsic to the structuring and the transmission of
intimate spaces, of the passions, of love, lust, anger, hate, jealousy,
sorrow, and longing, as dimensions both of judgment and of law. The
querelle des lois, in other words, suggests a complex embrace or
enfolding of different laws; an enfolding which historically has left
formal legal rule as the visible surface or apparent sovereign of the
order of laws. Be that as it may, the notion of an enfolding of laws
suggests both embrace and difference, appearance and occlusion.
The metaphor of the fold doubtless has a variety of sexual or
gender-based connotations. However one might wish to elaborate
such allusions, they also offer a final point as to the querelle des lois,
namely, that of their relation to the querelle des femmes in the sense
of the relation between laws of love and the historical and social
definition of femininity. Genevieve Fraisse has recently and rightly
warned against the danger of simply equating emotion, care, and love
with femininity. 49 In this instance, and particularly in relation to
women's courts and judgments of love, her point is a persuasive one.
The jurisdiction of the laws of love and the concept of an intimate
public sphere within which they are elaborated and applied-the
salons, alcoves, conservatories, consistories, gardens, and dreams-
may well be a space of difference, but it is not a space of one or other
gender. The reason is simple: Amatory jurisprudence is concerned
with the intermediate domains of relationship and with the space
48. See BLOCH, supra note 2, at 254.
49. See GENEVItVE FRAISSE, LES FEMMES ET LEUR HISTOIRE 74 (1998).
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across which desires are communicated. That "space in between"
belongs to neither gender and cannot be appropriated by any single
identity or genre. Precisely by virtue of its intimacy, it cannot be
owned but can only be felt. Indeed it does not bear a rationalistic or
proprietorial definition; it is a law that is made in the image of its very
staging.
III. AMATORY JURISPRUDENCE
I suspect that covertly, secretly, I am suggesting by way of the
example of the laws of love a species of training that the medievals
would have termed in utroque iuris (in both laws). The vinculum iuris
should in this view be offered as a choice of laws or as a partial law,
and affectio, or indeed gaudium iuris, could be its counterpart in the
jurisdiction of the affections or geography of intimate desires. Affects
accompany all interactions, and that is as true of legal processes and
judgments as it is of teaching, parenting, or hugging the road. If the
querelle des lois at one level simply argues that rhetoric too can play
the law, then indeed it does play the law and informs a jurisdiction of
its own through the lengthy debate and disquisition upon the ethics of
emotion and the pain and pleasure of passions.
Returning again to the historiographical path charted in this
Article, the analysis of amatory jurisprudence as law can begin by
reference back to the loveday (jour d'amour) and its various
procedures of settlement or resolution through amity and love. Here
the issue was initially and directly that of a choice of laws, and the
question posed to historians is precisely that of why this largely
unacknowledged jurisdiction was so pervasive and so popular. The
answer would seem to relate to the local character of the action per
amorem and so also to its intrinsic links to the polity of friends and
neighbors, a polity explicitly defined in terms of affect, relationship,
and caritas (care). It was the need to maintain the affective bonds of
local community, together with the necessarily continuing nature of
the relationship between disputants-their proximity in every sense-
that made love a procedure preferable to the antinomic character of
legal process and the separation imposed by formal legal judgment.
In more distinctly jurisprudential terms, the concordiae and
conventiae studied by Stephen White evidenced a number of
distinctive features. 0 The agreements never divided the parties into
50. See White, supra note 28.
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winner and loser, but rather always left each party with something of
what they had claimed or resisted surrendering. In addition, the
compromise, rather than separating the disputants, would bring them
together and forge new ties, if not of friendship or love, then at least
of recognition and accommodation. Parties would forgive, pardon,
pray, or even give something to the other, and the reconciliation as a
whole would be marked by the performance of some symbolic act,
such as a kiss, a shared meal, the placing of a knife upon the altar, or
the exchange of gifts. Granted the propinquity, the intimacy of
medieval communities, the advantage of love over law lay equally as
much in the benefit that it provided to the collectivity as in the
satisfaction that it provided to the subjects of the dispute. Moreover,
White acknowledges that both adversaries and the community and
friends "believed that [conventiae] were not only 'firmer' than
judgments, but also, in some sense, more 'just. '''51
It is equally a sense of the justice of love, a sense of a different
relationship between knowledge and power in the domain of affects,
that seems to have governed the elaborations of amatory
jurisprudence. Felicity of judgment, poethics, and an attention to
appearance, to images and to bodies, seem to have been the
distinctive features or combinatory logic of amatory jurisprudence.
More than that, if it is interpreted as a jurisprudence, as a knowledge
of a legal jurisdiction, then it should be possible to list synoptically
and preliminarily how it knows, what it knows, and how it interprets
and maps the emotional spaces of social life. At the risk of an
appalling syncretism that mixes judgments and poems, codes and
fictions, and also and perhaps worse plays havoc with the historical
specificity of the emotions, I will offer a brief tabulation of some of
the more significant features of amatory jurisprudence as practiced in
the long term of the courts and judgments of love.
A. An Epistemic of Amatory Law
Like any casuistry, the judgments of love elaborated the rules of
its jurisdiction from the pathology of amorous disputes. It knew love
through its violence and its passion; it knew the social life of the
emotions through their excess or their death. Where formal law has
tended to match the extremism or pathology of cases with the purity
or abstraction of norms; where, in other words, municipal law has
51. See id. at 303.
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endeavored to distance itself from the object of judgment and so to
act with cold reason and judicial detachment, the logic of amatory
jurisprudence has been one of engagement and of dialogue. To
engage the passions is to attempt to communicate rather than to
judge; it is in essence the suspension of judgment or of knowing,
aporia rather than verity. Put differently, the rhetoric of excess-of
hyperbole, meiosis, ecphonesis, auxesis-is that of the transgression
of the limits of communication. It seeks recognition or help as much
as it seeks definition or dismissal. It is in this vein that amatory
jurisprudence was most distinctive in its aporetic or even
experimental attention to the corporeal signs of excess and to the
deferral of judgment as the paradoxical form of judgment.
With respect to the semiotic of excess, the pathology of the
emotions, the Code of Love is perhaps the most interesting example.
Love was understood as marking the body, and much of the Code is
thus given over to a corporeal semiotic of desire. To be in love is
marked by stammering, blushes, fainting, palpitations, perspiration
and other excretions as well as loss of appetite and sleeplessness.
Jealousy and obsession, a constant reverie in which the image of the
beloved was obsessively in mind and present in every act, was a
measure of the degree of love. In that such physical excitations and
colorations were the marks of the passage of desire, the laws of love
were as much concerned with providing a space and legitimacy for
these intensities as it was with judging their mundane effects. To love
was to risk everything; to cease to love was to die. In that context of
extremes, knowledge was explicitly a form of engagement, a species
of intervention, even or especially when that intervention did not
know or judge but rather attended to the signs of a dilemma and gave
a space or structure to the expression of the agonies or ecstasies of
desire.
The distinctive epistemic that runs through the judgments of love
is thus one of dialogue and of doubt. With regard to the dialogic form
of amatory judgment, we have already noted the principle of
exchange evident even in the action per amorem of medieval local law
and lovedays. It needs only to be added in this respect that the
absence of extreme determinations in courts of love no doubt reflects
the absence of violent means of enforcement. The strongest penalty
imposed in the women's courts of the iudicia amoris was exile from
the domain of love. The more usual penalty was the sanction of the
disapprobation of the court, and occasionally a decision was proffered
on the liberty of a lover to end a relationship or the duty to remain
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faithful to an estranged or distant love. The principal feature of the
judgments was thus not arbitrium but rather hermeneutic. Judgments
were heuristic enterprises, exercises in dialogue and exchange that
sought both to learn from and to augment the project and the space
of amorous affairs. Even in the later tradition in which gay science
had come to connote parody or farce, rather than lyric or poetic
ethos, judgment was much less important than the dialogue between
the court, the parties, and where appropriate the procurators of love,
the doctors of love and other representatives of expertise in the
fashions and expressions of desire.
Perhaps aware that, especially within the domain of love, identity
is precarious, that love can effectuate dramatic changes of mood and
personality, the courts consistently remained open to the possibilities
of indecision. To take an example from Capellanus, one judgment
concerned the case of a confidant who betrayed his position of trust
and, rather than delivering the amorous messages of his friend,
seduced the woman to whom the correspondence was directed.12 The
Court of the Countess of Champagne deliberated at length upon the
case and eventually decided that the deceitful confidant deserved the
lover he had found, a woman who had not blushed while complying
with his betrayal of his trust. The lovers richly merited each other
and were at liberty to enjoy that love. In later case law, a comparable
indeterminacy, one that both acknowledged what the court did not
know and sought to learn from it, can be traced with relative ease.
Christine de Pisan, for example, formulates a book of three
judgments in which no judgment is ever given.53 The Suite Anonyme
de la Court d'Amours includes a final case in which six women
petitioned the court to determine which of them was the best lover.
After listening to their pleadings, the Bailiff concludes that each is the
best "according to their desire" but that beyond that "I do not
know. 5 4 In Boccaccio's Filocolo, the judge Fiammetta engages in
dialogue with her petitioners and revises her judgments in response to
their reactions to them.55
Resisting the temptation to provide further examples, the
distinctive epistemic feature of amatory jurisprudence thus seems to
lie in the complex and historically slow process of learning through
52. See CAPELLANUS, supra note 12, at 265.
53. See DE PISAN, Trois Jugemens, supra note 12.
54. See LE POIRIER, supra note 12, at 234-36.
55. See BOCCACCIO, supra note 37.
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the proximity of wager or trial rather than through the abstract and
violent application of formal rules. The justice of love did not
necessarily lend itself to logical excisions or to all-or-nothing
judgments: the pathologies of desire required attention, dialogue, and
pretty words, or treatment far more often than they needed or would
benefit from grave and formal determinations. In a final and poetic
example from de Vis6, a court was petitioned by a frustrated lover
who sought permission to end his life. After a lengthy and probing
dialogue, the court resolved that it was not within its competence to
determine this issue; it was for the plaintiff's lover to decide and he
should go to her.56
B. Aesthetics and Justice
The querelle des femmes was often a polemic over the status of
women as images. Particularly in its religious moments, though
certainly not only then, woman was defined as appearance and
dismissed as image rather than substance, "carnal pretence" rather
than spirit or referent. Painted faces, like painted words, were
semblances to be avoided, lures to servitude or to the loss of truth.
Several feminist historians have responded imaginatively to this
polemic and have argued that the history or, more technically, the
genealogy of women must be the narrative and recovery of images.
This work entails both making visible the discourses and ruptures that
obscured those images and theoretically elaborating the epistemic
strategies of excluding the image from the domains of knowledge and,
in my example, the jurisdictions of law.
Madame de Villedieu begins her Annales Galantes with the
observation that,
[G]reat decisions and events do not take place instantaneously,
they must be talked about and seen for their excess to be
appreciated and their extremity loved. I, therefore, augment
history with secret meetings and amorous discourses. If these are
not those actually pronounced, they are those which ought to have
been uttered. I have no more faithful memories than my
judgment .... 17
More recently, Genevieve Fraisse has suggested a comparable return
56. See HONORE D'URFt, LES EPISTRES MORALES ET AMOUREUSES 547 (Paris, Gilles
Robinet 1619).
57. 1 MARIE CATHERINE HORTENSE DESJARDINS, ANNALES GALANTES DIVISIE EN
HUIT PARTIES (Paris, Barbon 1670) (nonpaginated). Desjardins also published under the name
Madame de Villedieu.
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"to the ruptures, and beginnings which mark and resurrect the
construction of a problematics interior to time. A work of anamnesis
that looks to origins" and traces the aporia of identity and of sexual
difference through the strategies and discourses that constitute its
visible presence.58 Michelle Perrot, as well, declaims that "the history
of women is that of an unravelling of images";59 a history, in other
words, of the theoretical construction of women as images, a history
of representations.
The querelle des lois in this regard was precisely concerned, in its
masculine part, to keep images out of the formalities of law. The
point is that the exclusion of images from knowledge was an exclusion
of women from law. Amatory jurisprudence, in contrast, both sought
to know through images and imagination and devoted a significant
portion of its doctrinal energies and substantive judgments to
questions of appearance. De Vis6, in his Nouvelles Galantes, gives
the example of a case of love in which a man visiting a friend's house
for the first time notices a recent portrait of an exceptionally beautiful
woman.6 Granted that the portrait is recent, he assumes that the
woman can be found and remains at the friend's house so as to
facilitate his search. The portrait hangs in the dining room and the
friend's sister sits under it. At each meal the protagonist stares
longingly at the picture, sighs, goes pale, and otherwise evinces all the
signs of being in love. The sister imagines that she must be the object
of this passion. After the enamored man has failed to find the subject
of the portrait, he asks his friend who it is and is shown a storage
room packed full of paintings of this one woman. She was an
exceptionally beautiful ancestor who had stipulated in her will that
each generation should seek out the best artist living in their time and
have him paint her portrait in the latest style using her original
portrait as their model. When the sister understands the object of the
visitor's affections, she bursts into tears. If he had been tricked by the
portrait, she had equally been duped by his apparent desire for her.
Realizing the parity of these mistakes as to uncertain identities, the
couple fall in love and become lovers.
It does not require the theory of object choice to realize the
extent to which love is generated by appearances, by images and by
faces. It may not be the deepest love but it is probably the most
58. See FRAISSE, supra note 49, at 29.
59. See MICHELLE PERROT, LES FEMMES, OU, LES SILENCES DE L'HISTOIRE 351 (1998).
60. See DE VISt, supra note 12, at 311.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
active, and hence historically the danger and the value of images. In
the querelle des lois, amatory jurisprudence was both a play upon
images-a hermeneutic interpretation of appearances in terms of
images, an imagistic or simply imaginative response to problems of
representation-and a governance or mapping of the domains and
strategies of the image. From the Code of Love to the annals of the
pr&ieuses, amatory jurisprudence was directed most intensely
towards the domain of appearances, the realm of communication and
of representation. Thus the Code detailed the physical signs of love
and stipulated that an image of the beloved should always be present
in the mind of the lover. In later amatory law, the principle of
recognition and response to images is elaborated not only in terms of
the grounds for choosing or rejecting suitors but also with respect to
the role of fashion in love and of dress as a sign of both desirability
and affection.
In a case reported by Martial d'Auvergne, a man complained
that his lover spent too much upon dresses and asked the court to
prohibit further sumptuary extravagance. The court called tailors to
give evidence as to whether the woman's clothes were exorbitant
either in cost or in cut. They concluded from that evidence that the
woman dressed appropriately and d la mode.6 1 In other cases ranging
from the trobairitz to the carte de tendre, the laws that map the
intimate public sphere attend in particular detail to the appearances
and expressions of desire, while the doctrine of amour lointain is
devoted almost exclusively to the issue of the signs, the images and
mediations that structure a love at war with distance. Questions such
as when it was appropriate to kiss in public, how amorous meetings
were to be arranged, where they were to take place, and what dues or
symbols of love were to be exchanged were constantly debated and
judged. In all of these cases, amatory jurisprudence acknowledges
and engages the phantasmatic structure of justice, with appearances,
images, and the other weightless inscriptions of burning desires.
C. Gay Interpretation
A system of law is a system of communication. As a con-
sequence, it is marked most distinctly by its theory of interpretation.
Amatory jurisprudence has both benefited and suffered most from
the levity or simple joy of its interpretative procedures. In the
61. See D'AUVERGNE, supra note 8, at 143-44.
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tradition of amatory jurisprudence, the end of love is joy, either
physical or spiritual ecstasies, sometimes both. A justice that could
not respond appropriately to passion, that did not constitute an
erudition in eroticis, would not be justice at all. At its simplest, gay
science was an interpretation in eroticis, an interpretation bound not
to precedent but to possibility; not to law but to love. If amatory
justice at one level meant attending to and recognizing the emotional
plight of litigants, of those who wished to dispute per amorem, then
interpretation was itself an amorous act, one motivated by and
responsive to the cause of opening rather than closing the sites,
discourses, and images through which love passed.
The initial and most consistent feature of amatory hermeneutics
is, therefore, that it engages directly and passionately with the cause
of love. In a case law that ranges from the iudicia amoris to the latter-
day ars dictaminis and its formulary handbooks on love letters, the
overwhelming motive of judgment was that of holding open the social
space or domain of love. The law of love was explicit that it only
applied to the living. Those that did not love did not belong within
the court; those that did not love were lost to life. Much case law is
thus devoted to enticing or seducing individuals into love, with
granting permission, legitimating feeling, and overcoming fear. The
purpose of judgment and the justice of amatory interpretation was
that of facilitating desire, of opening and maintaining the space of
love, the nonproprietorial space in between the lovers, what Irigaray
terms the entre deux. 62
As to the substantive interpretations offered in the cases, two
general features of amorous interpretation can be depicted. First, the
form of judgment was explicitly erotic. Where a lover had stolen a
kiss in public and his lover pleaded what Benoit de Court expounds as
larrecin publique of a kiss, the court wished to support his defence of
justification: the occasion had presented itself and he had acted on
impulse. 63 The resolution offered was that his lover should kiss him
freely in public, so long as her husband was not within sight. In terms
of the specific cause of action, she should give him ten kisses, each
lasting as long as it takes to say the de profundis. In other cases, the
same form of interpretation and judgment is frequently found. A
lover had mistaken a passionate kiss for violence and hit her lover
62. See LUCE IRIGARAY, I LOvE TO You: SKETCH FOR A FELICITY WITHIN HISTORY 109-
11 (Alison Martin trans., 1996).
63. See DE COURT, supra note 8, at 259.
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with her hat so fiercely that the hatpin had cut his nose. She was
ordered to bandage the wound every day, morning and night, and
specifically to moisten the wound with the saliva of her kisses until it
was healed. 64 Where a woman had playfully surprised her lover in
public by putting dirt down the back of his shirt and he had
responded violently, the court listened at length to the phantasies of
the outraged woman and her friends. She wanted him to be tied
naked to a post in the courtyard where he had hurt her. There she
and her friends would beat him with birch sticks. After debating this
and other possibilities, the court opted to punish the man by having
him stripped naked by three old women and then thrown into the
bushes wrapped in a foul smelling blanket. 6
The second substantive feature of amorous legal hermeneutics is
their hedonism. The law is read in terms of an explicit and direct
attention to corporeal pleasures. While it is true that this
hermeneutic is marked by lightness and even a certain ludic inversion
of secular law, the object of interpretation is consistently the
facilitation of amorous encounters. Social space is read according to
the possibilities of desire and the problems or questions of love are
elaborated as problems of transmission: How is desire to be
communicated across hostile social spaces? What messengers and
media best approximate encounter? How are lovers to make the
transition from absence to physical presence? It is in relation to the
last question that the troubadour and trobairitz most famously
marked the temporal stages of consummation and mapped the
moments and parts of the body that could be touched and tasted day
by day, night by night.
D. Historical Geographies of the Intimate Public Sphere
A law that seeks to understand the affective public sphere, the
emotional life of institutions; a law that engages with phantasms and
judges images; a law that mixes wisdom and desire, spirit and body, is
evidently a law that differs markedly from the conscious strategies of
justice in the extant public sphere. I have not here had time to digress
upon all the different ways that amatory jurisprudence might add to
or supplement formal law or our knowledge of the causes of public
acts. This other country or carte de tendre is known by anamnesis and
64. See D'AUVERGNE, supra note 8, at 14-15.
65. See id. at 213-14.
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exists only to the extent that the image is valued and affect is
understood. In a sense, these two prescriptions are part of the same
hermeneutic. Anamnesis refers to a prior or incorporated memory,
the bodily inscription of ethic or habit that constitutes the literal
corpora or subjects of law. To say that the body knows or that it is
necessary to map the corporeality of knowledge is simply to say that
experience, affect or soul, has a place in our knowledge of law. To
understand affect, charge, or repetition, whether through the
cartography of past erotic erudition-as, for example, the carte de
tendre of the pr&ieuses-or through our own incorporation of
knowledge, is necessarily to attempt a species of self-criticism
predicated upon the need to comprehend our own past.
Reverting to my opening anecdote of Valentine's Day rites in
Paris, the narrative was most immediately one of protest and of
conflict of laws. It was also, however, a narrative that could be
understood most productively as one of overlapping historical and
legal spaces. For the mid-seventeenth-century Parisian amatory
lawyers, the prdcieuses, the politics of judgment, of justice in
relationship, of hedonic laws, was to be understood in terms of social
spaces and of how they are marked and mapped. 66 To the extent that
we now necessarily recognize the virtuality of laws-that a system of
law is a system of thought-the cartography of the emotional public
sphere produced by the prdcieuses, the carte de tendre or social map of
the heart, provides an excellent example of an erotic erudition that
traces an alternative law that itself dates back to Aphrodite and
Diotima, to Sappho, to the trobairitz, to women's courts and the
judgments of love. The contemporary querelle des lois, however,
tends to preclude attribution of the status of law to such a polemical
or explicitly affective mapping of relationship. That, however, is
simply a prise de position, or in Gadamer's terms a prejudice. From
the other side of the querelle des lois, it can equally be argued that the
contemporary legal mapping or form of human relationship, that of a
belligerent contractually defined public sphere and its agonistic or
actuarial discourses of judgment, is both partial and emotionally
numb. If affect is valued; if the intensity and duration of relationship
is also a potential idiom of law, then the feministic map of the
prdcieuses, the endeavor to do justice to relationships between the
66. On the carte de tendre, see 1 MADELEINE DE SCUDtRY, CLELIE, HISTOIRE ROMAINE
399 (Paris, Augustin Courb6 1660) (1654) (currently available edition). For contemporary
commentary, see JOAN DEJEAN, TENDER GEOGRAPHIES: WOMEN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
NOVEL IN FRANCE (1991).
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genres and between difference, has every right to claim a place in the
sphere or pantheon of laws.67
CONCLUSION
Our past is inscribed by and known through the pattern of our
relationships, through love and through friendship. The gender
performances, hedonic strategies, or covert knowledges of love that
we inherit and incorporate, repeat and act out, are the camera
obscura through which we view the past of love and the possibilities
of amatory law. My concluding point is thus to reiterate that in an era
in which the unresolved querelle des femmes, or opposition of the
genders, still dominates the quotidian life of the institution, the plural
account of distinct and overlapping jurisdictions -what Nietzsche
termed the comparative history of laws-still gets written, if at all,
from positions lodged within the structure of antinomy or opposition.
The querelle des lois is in this sense a novel concept. It refers to the
affective and epistemic hierarchy throdgh which we claim to know
and order both social and historical accounts of law. Insofar as
institutional custom or prejudgment still maintains a clear hierarchy
of both knowledge and law, the querelle des lois remains an open and
opaque topic. Suffice it to say that it continues and indeed that in an
explicit sense it has hardly begun. In that its object is a space between
genders and lovers, a gay and undefined domain of emotive
transmission, of touch and caress, the laws of love open identity to
doubt and mix both genres. In a contemporary idiom, there is
nothing heteronormative about lover's laws. There is only the patient
and long term attempt to construct a jurisprudence, a knowledge of
the space and drama of love, the power of images and the bonds of
affection, in the historical and political comedy of life.
67. For a reading of Irigaray in these terms, see Alain Pottage, A Unique and Different
Subject of Law, in LAW AND THE POSTMODERN MIND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
JURISPRUDENCE 13 (Peter Goodrich & David Gray Carlson eds., 1998).
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